UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

MARC	VEASEY,	ET AL.,)	CASE NO: 2:13-CV-00193
)	
		Plaintiffs,)	CIVIL
)	
	vs.)	Corpus Christi, Texas
)	
RICK	PERRY, E	T AL.,)	Friday, June 6, 2014
)	(2:54 p.m. to 2:56 p.m.)
		Defendants.)	(3:01 p.m. to 4:01 p.m.)

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

BEFORE THE HONORABLE NELVA GONZALES RAMOS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Appearances: See Next Page

Court Recorder: Genay Rogan

Clerk: Brandy Cortez

Transcriber: Exceptional Reporting Services, Inc.

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361 949-2988

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    Mr. Rios?
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         (No audible response)
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              THE CLERK: For the Texas League of Young Voters,
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    Mr. Haygood?
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         (No audible response)
              Mr. Dunbar?
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              MS. KORGANKAR: He won't be joining us. This is
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    Natasha Korgankar. I'm here.
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              THE CLERK: Thank you. Will you be the only one
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    speaking?
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              MS. KORGANKAR: I will be.
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              THE CLERK: Okay. Thank you.
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              And, then, for the State of Texas, Mr. Whitley,
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    Mr. Donnell, Mr. D'Andrea, Mr. Scott?
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              MR. SCOTT: John Scott and Reid Clay on one phone.
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              THE CLERK:
                          Thank you.
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              MR. D'ANDREA: This is Arthur D'Andrea on another
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    phone.
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              THE CLERK: Thank you. And will you three be doing
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    the speaking?
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              MS. DEASON: This is Whitney Deason on another phone,
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    and I will be speaking as well.
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              THE CLERK: Thank you.
         (Off the record from 2:55:38 until 2:55:43)
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- 1 is present for the Texas League of Young Voters. Mr. Scott,
- 2 Mr. Clay, Mr. Whitley, Mr. Donnell, Mr. D'Andrea, and
- 3 Ms. Deason are present for the State of Texas.
- 4 THE COURT: All right. We've got several matters
- 5 | pending. Let me just go through a couple of the old matters
- 6 before we discuss the motions to quash. But there was a
- 7 | defendant's amended motion to compel that I believe the
- 8 remaining issue was the common interest doctrine and the
- 9 parties submitted a brief on that, or a joint -- not a joint
- 10 | statement that you all agreed, but it was a one -- one document
- 11 | submitted. Anything else on that, Mr. Scott?
- 12 MS. DEASON: Your Honor, this is Whitney Deason with
- 13 | defendant. I'll be speaking to that issue.
- 14 **THE COURT:** Okay.
- 15 MS. DEASON: The issue here can really be broken down
- 16 | into two -- two issues. The first issue is a more global
- 17 | issue. It's really whether the common interest doctrine
- 18 applies in the Fifth Circuit, and the law is clear here that
- 19 | the Fifth Circuit does not recognize common interest doctrine
- 20 for plaintiffs. We've cited numerous cases in both the
- 21 statement that was submitted Monday, as well as even the motion
- 22 to compel, that notes that the application of the common
- 23 | interest doctrine is specifically limited in the Fifth Circuit
- 24 to co-defendants and potential co-defendants and that Fifth
- 25 | Circuit recognizes the doctrine as narrowly construed because

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it's an obstacle (indiscernible). And the reason that courts have exhibited such restraint in applying this doctrine is that it excludes documents and communications from discovery.

The defendant's current stance is that -- is consistent with the law in the Fifth Circuit, that this common interest doctrine does not apply to the plaintiff. And as such, we believe that the documents currently being withheld on this basis should be produced.

The second issue, which hinges on your Honor's ruling on the first issue, but I'd like to address is very quickly, is, you know, whether the Court -- if the Court decides to go ahead and grant this protection to plaintiffs in this circuit and essentially create new law in the Fifth Circuit, then we need to address the fact that plaintiffs need to provide logs documenting the communications that they're withholding on this To date, plaintiffs -- plaintiffs and plaintiff basis. intervenors have not provided any logs documenting the communications they're withholding on this basis. They've essentially flatly refused to log thousands of communications they claim to be withholding on this basis. And I think it's important to note that in logging this information the common interest doctrine is not a privilege in and of itself; it is, instead, an extension of an underlying privilege, such as attorney-client or work product. And, so, what happens is the common interest doctrine simply prevents a waiver of that

foundational privilege when a communication occurs with the coparties. And, so, in logging any communications that they may
be able to protect under this doctrine, they need to identify
that -- the foundational evidence for that underlying privilege
that they're seeking to extend.

You know, it's also important to note that Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure places the burden on the party withholding documents based on privilege to show that those documents are, in fact, privileged. Otherwise, other parties, in this case, defendants, can't adequately assess whether those privileges apply. So, if your Honor is -- is going to extend this doctrine in this case and potentially create new law in this circuit and allow for these documents to be protected, they need to be logged.

And I think it's important to note that to the extent plaintiffs and plaintiff intervenors suggest that the agreement concerning production format supports the existence of a common interest doctrine or allows them to not log the communications that they have with one another, between parties, which was suggested in the -- the agreement or the joint statement submitted on Monday, that suggestion is incorrect. On its face, paragraph 25 of that agreement is expressly limited to the United States Department of Justice and the Texas Attorney General's Office. And I just want to read an abbreviated version of it quickly, because I think the language is very

important. It says:

"The parties need not note on a privilege log any document exchanged solely among counsel, individuals working directly on behalf of counsel in connection with this litigation, or supervisory staff of the United States Department of Justice or the Texas Attorney General's Office."

I think the language here shows that this provision does not address communication between both parties. It simply addresses intra-agency communications; so, communications within these two government agencies. So, for example, you know, an attorney with DOJ who may have to correspond with various support staff or who may have to send something up and down the chain, we're not -- we don't think that those communications should be logged, and that's what this specific provision goes to. It doesn't go towards any communications that may occur between the co-parties.

The last (indiscernible) note here is -- I'm going to sort of -- we're in a different boat with DOJ because they have provided privilege logs to this point. However, after three chances to provide an adequate privilege log, they continue to fall short in that their most recent supplemental privilege log contained numerous entries that claimed multiple privileges, including common interests and work product. Instead of actually establishing the elements of those privileges claimed

- 1 and showing how the documents that were withheld based on those 2 privileges were properly held on the basis of those privileges, 3 they simply provided document description of e-mails, so one -the one-word description. That does not allow us to adequately 4 5 assess whether the privilege is properly applied. 6 So, you know, to sum up, essentially, our stance is 7 that the law in the Fifth Circuit is very clear --THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you about that. 8 9 you say that the doctrine has not been recognized by the Fifth 10 Circuit, does -- does -- is there a case from the Fifth Circuit 11 specifically say that, or the cases before the Fifth Circuit 12 have been regarding co-defendants and potential co-defendants, 13 or has the Fifth Circuit specifically said it does not apply to 14 plaintiffs? 15 MS. DEASON: The Fifth Circuit has recognized time 16 and again that it does not apply to plaintiffs. You know, I --17 I believe in the April 15th hearing we had asked the Department 18 of Justice to point to a case where it could, and it couldn't. 19 Uh --20 THE COURT: But I am now asking you to point me to a 21 case that says it does not apply to plaintiffs, that expressly 22 says that. MS. DEASON: And --
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- 24 THE COURT: Can you point me to that case?
- 25 MS. DEASON: So, In re Santa -- excuse me? Okay.

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              THE COURT: Can you point me to that case?
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              MS. DEASON: In re Santa Fe is a case, Fifth Circuit
    case, that says -- specifically limits the application of the
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    common interest doctrine to co-defendants and potential co-
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    defendants.
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              THE COURT: And did that case involve plaintiffs
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    trying to take advantage of that doctrine?
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              MS. DEASON: No, ma'am. That -- that case involves
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    defendants.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Has there been any case before the
    Fifth Circuit where the plaintiffs have tried to take
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    advantage, I guess, of that -- of that privilege and the Fifth
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    Circuit has said, no, it does not apply to plaintiffs?
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              MS. DEASON: Not in a -- not in the same -- not in an
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    analogous situation to what we have in this case.
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              THE COURT: Any -- any situation where the Fifth
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    Circuit has said this common interest doctrine does not apply
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    to plaintiffs?
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         (Pause)
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              MS. DEASON: Um, yes, your Honor. One -- one minute.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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         (Pause)
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              MS. DEASON: All right. Your Honor, we believe that
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    even though In re Santa Fe does involve defendants --
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
                                 Ma'am --
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              MS. DEASON: -- on the (indiscernible) --
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              THE COURT: -- please answer my question.
                                                         I'm trying
    to narrow the issue here so that it will -- I don't have to do
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    as much research as we've already done on this end, because
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    you're arguing very generally, and that's kind of not what I've
    seen the law necessarily to say. So, what I'm trying to figure
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    out, when you say the Fifth Circuit has not recognized the
    common interest doctrine for plaintiffs, has that court
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    actually said that? Has there been a case where they ruled
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    that on, or are you just analogizing? And if you are, that's
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    fine. That's just all I'm trying to pinpoint here.
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              MS. DEASON:
                           I -- I can't point you to a specific
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           The best example I could give you would be a decision
    out of the Eastern District of Louisiana, 2012, Crosby versus
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    Blue Cross Blue Shield. They said:
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              "The Court has found no authority in this circuit
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              which extends common legal interest principles to
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              plaintiffs."
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              And that case specifically involved -- specifically
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    says that because Crosby is the plaintiff in this suit, there
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    is no indication -- and there is no indication that she will be
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    occupying defensive posture in this case, the -- the other
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    group involved does not fall under the rule; and that other
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    group is not necessarily the plaintiff (indiscernible), but
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that -- that's the best --

1 THE COURT: Okay.

2 MS. DEASON: That's the best response I can give you 3 (indiscernible).

4 **THE COURT:** All right. Who's going to argue the 5 motion on the plaintiff's side?

MR. ROSENBERG: Your Honor, Ezra Rosenberg on behalf of Texas NAACP and the Mexican American Legislative Caucus, and I'll begin. I think Mr. Derfner will have a few words after I speak, if that's okay with your Honor.

10 **THE COURT:** Yes.

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MR. ROSENBERG: I will be brief, because we think that we have laid this out. And your Honor asked the right question, which was: Is there any such Fifth Circuit law that holds in the manner that Texas has said it holds, and the answer is clearly no. Matter of fact, no court in the country has ever ordered discovery of this kind. And just briefly, the -- the case that Texas just relied on, Crosby versus Blue Cross, we dealt with in footnote three of our brief. magistrate's decision that quoted dicta from another case, which was Stanley, which is another magistrate's decision, and there the person seeking to invoke the doctrine had a financial interest in the litigation but was neither a co-plaintiff nor a potential co-plaintiff. So, you have dicta based upon dicta, not Fifth Circuit level; we have other circuits which have applied the doctrine to plaintiffs, and no case -- and, your

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Honor, I -- when I'm not doing pro bono work, I do mass tort defense. And in those sorts of cases we have numerous cases where there are numerous plaintiffs represented by different counsel, and I'm not aware of any instance where even in those cases the defendants have sought to intrude upon attorneys' work product, which is what this is all about. That's the one area where we do agree with Texas, because that's what they're trying to do, is get attorneys' work product by piercing the common interest protection. And there is even less basis here where, first of all, the same plaintiffs here were defendants in the Section 5 suit where Texas expressly stated on the record that such communications were protected by the common interests of the defendants there and asserted its own common interest protection even though they were plaintiffs. Second, here the parties agreed -- and I'm going to quote the full sentence from the agreement concerning production format, which is ECF 61-6. In paragraph 25 it says: "However, the parties" -- not just Texas and the

"However, the parties" -- not just Texas and the

Department of Justice, but -- "the parties need not

note on a privilege log any document, including but

not limited to draft documents, exchanged solely

among counsel, individuals working directly on behalf

of counsel in connection with this litigation,"

parens, "(e.g. paralegals, analysts, and litigation

support staff)," end parens, and then there is a

comma, "or supervisory staff of the U.S. Department
of Justice or the Office of the Texas Attorney
General."

So, the limitations that DOJ and the Texas A.G. only have to do with supervisory staff, because the private plaintiffs don't have supervisory staff in their counsel, but the sentence as a whole applies to all parties, including the private plaintiffs and plaintiff intervenors, and was a clear recognition by -- in this agreement that even though these are privileged communications, they don't have to be logged, because otherwise every party would be logging thousands upon thousands of internal e-mails because all of us deal with work product virtually every minute of every day.

And, third, this Court has ordered, and Texas has expressly requested, that counsel for the plaintiffs coordinate their efforts. In the number of depositions, we're supposed to coordinate with the DOJ and all of the private plaintiffs; the number of interrogatories; and, as your Honor recently indicated, the number of hours it filed. And you can't do that without coordination. Now, I want to emphasize what that has meant here.

First of all, as your Honor knows, we have not burdened this Court with redundant and duplicative pleadings, because we've coordinated among ourselves and with the Department of Justice. And that's taken a boat load of

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coordination. I tried to count up briefly -- for example, just in preparing this submission, the joint submission, I counted about 100 to 150 e-mails between and among counsel. And according to Texas, they have a right to see those e-mails. And there's just absolutely no justification for that. want to know who our fact witnesses are going to be, they're going to get that at the appropriate time in accordance with what the rules that this Court sets down. If they want to know who our experts are going to be, there's going -- there is a procedure for that. And if they want to know, as they say in their brief, how intervenors and plaintiffs choose to interpret Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and why Texas has been targeted with this litigation -- that's their words on page three or four of their brief -- well, first of all, they can read the complaint; they can propound -- they have the right to propound appropriate contention interrogatories, or they can wait for the findings of fact and conclusions of law. What they can't do is intrude on our work product or force the plaintiffs to log thousands upon thousands of e-mails dealing with pretrial discovery and trial strategy. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Derfner, were you going 22 to say anything? Yes. I'm going to be very brief, your MR. DERFNER: Honor, although, frankly, my (indiscernible) may be a little

I want to -- I think we all need to apologize to the

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    Court for wasting your time, and, frankly, I feel like wasting
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    my time, because the issue we have here is claims that the
    common interest rule applies to defendants but not to
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    plaintiffs. It is not just frivolous; it is utter nonsense.
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              Over the past several weeks I have asked three
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    times -- three separate times -- I have asked counsel,
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    different counsel for the State of Texas, to find me a case --
    and I used the phrase "in the length and breadth of the United
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    States of America" -- a case where lawyers for co-plaintiffs in
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    a actual case, making communications out of that case, have
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    been ordered to turn that in. Never got a case. Didn't get a
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    case like that on Monday when the paper was filed, and we,
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    obviously, didn't get one just now. They've never offered a
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    case; they've never offered even a reason, a policy reason or a
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    legal reason, why courts would conjure up such a bizarre one-
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    way rule that they (indiscernible).
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              This is a complex case with a lot to do. Your Honor
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    is overburdened; we are all overburdened. If we keep having to
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    take junk issues like this -- and I use that term advisedly --
    we will never get to the trial date. And I think we all know
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    what we're facing. But we need to get -- to deal with the real
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    issues, not issues like this.
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              THE COURT: All right. Any --
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I apologize again to the Court, and I MR. DERFNER: thank (indiscernible).

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1 THE COURT: All right. Anyone from the Government or 2 anything further from any other plaintiff? MS. WESTFALL: Yes. This is Elizabeth Westfall for 3 the United States. We strongly support everything that has 4 5 been argued by Mr. Rosenberg and Mr. Derfner, and we would add from the outset, I mean, that Texas did not even fulfill the 6 7 threshold issue of seeking -- of -- of stating any basis and that -- for seeking this discovery from the outset. 8 9 requests fall outside the scope of permissible discovery 10 allowed by Rule 26(b). Under that rule discovery is confined 11 to information that's relevant to actual claims and defenses, 12 and the only thing that Texas has argued as to why it's 13 relevant is that they are seeking information about plaintiffs' 14 motivation in suing Texas over its photo I.D. law. In other 15 words, defendants are seeking mental impressions, opinions, and 16 legal theories of they're opposing counsel, so that is not 17 appropriate under Rule 26(b). 18 I would add that the United States did not need to 19 log any of these communications because the requests sought 20 information that's simply not relevant. We do not need to 21 amend our logs. And for that reason alone this discovery 22 should be -- should be denied. 23 THE COURT: All right. Anything final, Ms. Deason? 24 MS. DEASON: Yes, I'd like to touch on a few points 25 that remain. First, with respect to the agreement concerning

- production format, I think the language is pretty clear that it is specifically tailored to the DOJ and the Texas Attorney

 General's Office.
- Furthermore, on -- I believe it was Mr. Rosenberg's point about work product. You know, we -- we are primarily concerned here with communications that -- that show the underlying facts of why plaintiff has decided to litigate this issue. And, so, to the extent that, you know, these communications that may reflect trial strategy or coordination of discovery efforts are more appropriately deemed work product, which is a qualified privilege, than common interests, we -- we're okay with that. However, those documents need to be logged. That's something that plaintiffs have failed to do to this point.

Finally, let's see, with respect to the relevance issue, you know, we -- we're slowly but surely developing a picture of what has gone on and the efforts of, you know, (indiscernible) create litigation where perhaps none should exist. And, you know, just recently through, you know, deposition testimony that we took the last few weeks, you know, we've learned of an individual plaintiff who was never informed by anybody that she could form -- she could obtain a form of free identification to vote under SB 14, and she specifically said that, having learned of such an option, she would probably go get one. You know, so we believe that these types of

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- communications are relevant to the allegations that plaintiffs have made in their complaint, and, you know, they're relevant to any affirmative defenses we might make. THE COURT: All right. Court finds the common interest doctrine applies to the communications between -- or, I guess, among the plaintiffs and their counsel. So, is the next issue the log, Ms. Deason? MS. DEASON: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Anything further on that, Counsel? MR. ROSENBERG: Just the tremendous burden of logging thousands upon thousands of e-mails that have absolutely no relevance to the -- and are not relevant for purposes of discovery, and in light of the agreement which, as I read, and if your Honor looks at it you'll see, that the -- it applies to the parties; not all the parties, not just DOJ and Texas, except the supervisory staff provision. And, by the way, this is Ezra Rosenberg. Excuse me. THE COURT: Court's not going to require that those documents be, I guess, set forth in the privilege logs. Anything else on that issue? MS. DEASON: Your Honor, this is Whitney Deason for defendants. I would just like to state that, you know, defendants have gone through hundreds of thousands of documents
 - themselves and logged in the tens of thousands of documents in privilege logs.

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THE COURT: But are you talking about documents
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    regarding this common interest doctrine? Because that's what I
    thought was left; and that's the only thing I'm addressing
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    right now. You can certainly argue something else, but I'm
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    just trying to close out this remaining issue on the common
    interest doctrine.
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              MR. SCOTT: Your Honor, John Scott for the Texas
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    defendants.
                 That's all on this.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So, that's all on that matter.
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              Another thing -- as far as I know, then, there is
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    nothing left on that amended motion to compel? Ms. Deason or
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    Mr. Scott?
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              MS. DEASON: I don't believe so.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. SCOTT: That's all at this time.
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              THE COURT: All right. Then, the other thing you all
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    were still negotiating -- I'm just following up on the United
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    States' motion for a protective order regarding the Rule
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    30(b)(6) deposition. And I don't have anything right now
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    before me. I know you all were still negotiating. So, do we
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    need to address anything today on that?
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              MR. SCOTT: Your Honor, John Scott for the Texas
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    defendants. We are still in the process of formulating some
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    proposed stipulations. In addition, the person that
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    actually -- we've got a portion of that stuff we're going to
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bring forward to the Court, but she's out of the country today, and that's not going to be ripe till next week.

THE COURT: Okay. Then -- but anything that's going to be ripe for our, I guess, ten-day status conferences, or whatever, I need a little bit of a heads up if you all want me to try to make a ruling at the time of the hearing. Otherwise, you know, if I'm getting hit with it at that point, I may need a little bit of time. But that's something you all can talk to between yourselves and with Brandy about when maybe you can get a joint statement in or a little bit of briefing; whatever is required, I'm sure you all can visit about.

so, the next thing I have is what we had discussed regarding the document production by the defendants and we had -- that last hearing we had and the Court had ordered that produced to the -- to the private plaintiffs. There's some competing orders that have been provided to the Court. So, is there anything else that you all want to discuss with the Court on that? I really think that the proposed order by the Government that was attached to 297 reflects the Court's ruling at that hearing. I understand, Mr. Scott, that you all want to discuss federal databases. But for purposes of my ruling at that hearing, I think what was submitted by the Government properly reflects the Court's order.

MR. SCOTT: And, your Honor, the portion that relates to us -- the Texas defendants being able to pursue those

- 1 databases, we did not want to be viewed as being in violation
- 2 of any court order. And, so, I understood the Court to say
- 3 | that's (indiscernible) still go forward with that; we're just
- 4 | not going to do it at this time.
- 5 THE COURT: Okay. So, then, I'm going to, then,
- 6 enter the Government's proposed order attached to DE-297. The
- 7 State can still proceed at some point if you're going to argue
- 8 the issue with the federal databases, correct?
- 9 MR. SCOTT: We do want those federal databases. And,
- 10 again, your Honor, without those we're not -- we've been -- I
- 11 | think I've asked for the ability to refer to, I guess, provide
- 12 | a defensive strategy.
- 13 | MS. BALDWIN: Your Honor, if I could speak to, you
- 14 know, the issue of the federal databases -- this is not an
- 15 | issue that needs to be reopened at this juncture, and I'm happy
- 16 | to put in context of the threat that it would raise to this
- 17 | litigation. Essentially, yielding to defendants' eleventh-hour
- 18 | threats as far as the parties' prior agreement and this Court's
- 19 prior orders seeking to obtain the federal databases that are
- 20 | fundamentally properly protected from disclosure under federal
- 21 | law can be virtually certain to do two things. The first is
- 22 | that -- and the time to pursue these databases would blow off
- 23 | the trial discovery schedule. Any order to produce that data
- 24 | would be subject to immediate appellate review by the United
- 25 | States, as we would seek all possible legal remedies to protect

1 | the databases from improper (indiscernible).

THE COURT: I'm going to stop you just real quickly.

Somebody's breathing very heavily into the phone, and it's

affecting the sound on this end. So, you can proceed.

MS. BALDWIN: Okay. Hopefully that wasn't me, your Honor. Second, your Honor, we would say that defendants, even were they granted access to the databases, would not have access to any more meaningfully relevant information than they already have. The database comparisons that defendants already derived through this process allowed them to query the federal databases, to have them searched in exactly the manner that defendants wanted, and they've already received those results. Having already gotten those results last Friday, defendants don't need access to the entire underlying databases and the tens of millions of underlying records that are totally unconnected to this case, to the SB 14, and to any Texas resident.

Defendants have argued in the pleadings last week that they would be disadvantaged if they're unable to obtain the federal databases. That argument presumes that the United States has full access to the federal data and that without the federal data the defendant can't prepare the defense. That's just not true, your Honor. The Department of Justice has no more access to the federal agencies defendants -- to the federal agencies' data than defendants or private plaintiffs

do.

We set up a process in this case where everyone set out the searches that they wanted to have done with the federal databases. We did the searches -- we provided the Texas data to the federal agencies, and they conducted those searches. At no time has the Department of Justice been able to conduct its own private comparisons of federal data in this action. And, in fact, the Court's order prohibits the United States from doing any data comparisons using Texas's data to the federal databases that aren't disclosed. The only comparisons using Texas data to federal data that have been and will be done in this case have already been done and disclosed in accordance with ECF Number 174.

So, to reopen at this issue at this point is just (indiscernible). Texas is unable to show that they are prejudiced in any way. No party has, based on the information that's been disclosed, your Honor, and -- and we went ahead and disclosed because there was an agreed-upon -- the portions of the proposed order last week that were agreed upon between defendants' proposed order and the United States' proposed orders recognized the same amount of the Texas voter registration database should be disclosed. We agreed on that as to the private plaintiffs. And, so, the United States has already gone ahead and disclosed that data, which, in our view, we were required to under this Court's scheduling order absent

another ruling from this Court.

So, having disclosed that information, the place we're in is that all parties have equal access to the same information on who is a registered voter in Texas from the Texas voter registration database, save for what that voter's full social security nine is, and whether they match on a search requested by either plaintiffs or the defendants, from the federal data as well as the Texas data. No party has the ability to generate new search results for which Texas voters lack any form of acceptable SB 14 I.D. And that's because only defendants and DOJ have access to the state issued data, and the -- the state-issued I.D. data, and the private plaintiffs have no access to that. And no party, not DOJ, not Texas, and not the private plaintiffs, have any access to the raw data on who holds federally-issued forms of I.D.

Your Honor, this process was necessary to protect the sensitive federal data issue, data that involves millions of passport holders and members of the military, who have no connection to this litigation. The vast majority of the people in the databases that Texas is now seeking, they aren't Texas residents, much less Texas registered voters. They have no connection to this litigation. Because of this, we sought to protect that sensitive information, which is subject to a host of other federal statutes that haven't even been briefed.

Again, any process that seeks to undo the delicate agreement

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that the parties struck is going to make a September trial schedule impossible and for no benefit. Defendants can't show any prejudice, and we would respectfully request that the Court not allow this issue to be reopened at this juncture.
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To the extent that the Court is inclined to consider allowing defendants access federal data, we would just say that it's far too important of an issue to be decided on an oral motion and that defendants should be required to set out in writing why they believe that they're entitled to the federal data, what information of any possible relevance they hope to glean from it that they don't already have from the results that they have that we've produced, and what prejudice that they're suffering without it, given that no other party has the access that they're seeking.

The United States believes that it is important to fully respond in writing because of the critical national security interest and data security interests that are implicated in this effort by defendants.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further, Mr. Scott?

MR. SCOTT: Your Honor --

MR. SPEAKER: Your Honor --

MR. SCOTT: -- it appears there's a common thread -- this is John Scott; very briefly. There is a common thread in DOJ's arguments. One, that there was some -- they (indiscernible) today that we had some agreement that was

and we now have to overcome that.

operating beforehand, that was the subject of Order Number 174 of this Court. That was true up until May 28th when they enticed this Court to blow that agreement up. There are no agreements anymore between the parties to avoid trying to get these databases. That was done away with when our position on what we had -- well, I really believe it was truly very well thought out -- had entered into an agreement that we thought foreclosed their ability to prove some vital issue up to this Court. The Court was able to give them a lifeline on May 28th,

Now, it's never been the standard in federal discovery that the person seeking it has to show how they're prejudiced if they don't get that discovery. So, this add-on aspect, that they would like to add as a burden we have under trying to -- on trying to obtain those databases, it just simply does not exist in the law.

From a more practical standpoint, we're dealing with -- just one example. We have a plaintiff that has testified in this case who goes to school down in South Texas; she was outside of Houston; she registered to vote in Texas; she will come up on the list as a no-match person because she has no Texas form of I.D. that would be acceptable under SB 14. Yet we have also found out that that same person is -- has registered to vote in Indiana and has applied for a driver's license, a learner's permit, up there. So, now we're dealing

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    with a situation that had we had -- if we had access to their
 2
    database, we could cross-reference that to all the different
 3
    people who show up on the no-match list, who now will have
 4
    histories of how they voted in the case as a result of that
 5
    lifeline, and we will be able to find out how many more of
 6
    those people are out there. I mean, and what we don't know,
 7
    unfortunately, is all of the other material that's out there in
 8
    those databases that might also help our case.
 9
              THE COURT:
                          Okay. It --
10
              MR. SCOTT:
                          So --
                          Let me -- let me do this.
11
              THE COURT:
12
              MR. SCOTT:
                         (indiscernible)
13
              THE COURT: Let me just --
14
                          (indiscernible) prejudice is not correct.
              MR. SCOTT:
15
              THE COURT: Let me do this.
16
                          Thank you.
              MR. SCOTT:
17
              THE COURT:
                         I do think it's an important issue that
18
    probably needs to be set forth in a written motion instead of
19
           So, would you want to file a motion, Mr. Scott?
20
              MR. SCOTT: That would be great, your Honor, and may
21
    we get an expedited --
22
              THE COURT: Okay.
23
              MR. SCOTT: -- basis so that we're not waiting 20 or
24
    10 days for their response given the discovery cutoff is here?
25
              THE COURT:
                           Okay.
                                 Well, let -- when can you get your
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1
    motion on file?
 2
              MR. SCOTT: Uh, David? Whitley?
              MR. WHITLEY: Your Honor, we would ask -- this is
 3
 4
    David Whitley with the defendants. Is Monday okay with your
 5
    Honor?
 6
              THE COURT:
                         But --
 7
              MR. SCOTT: How about Tuesday?
              THE COURT: Yeah.
                                 That's fine. I'm supposed to be
 8
 9
    in trial, so -- Ms. -- is it Baldwin that was speaking for
10
    the --
11
              MS. BALDWIN:
                           Yes, ma'am. This is Ms. Baldwin.
12
    apologize for not identifying earlier. But we would request,
13
    given the complexity of the issues, the number of federal
14
    agencies involved, no less than a week to respond.
15
              THE COURT: How about by Friday?
16
              MS. BALDWIN: We will absolutely do our best, your
17
    Honor.
18
              THE COURT: Okay. And you --
19
              MR. SPEAKER: (indiscernible)
20
              THE COURT: -- you all need to limit your -- your
21
    briefing, remember, per the Court's order.
22
              MR. SCOTT: Ten pages. Ten pages, right, your Honor?
23
              THE COURT:
                          Right.
24
              MR. DERFNER: Your Honor, the private plaintiffs will
25
    want to have something to say, too, on this, because,
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32
    frankly --
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 2
              THE COURT: That's fine.
              MR. DERFNER: -- I have not --
 3
 4
              THE COURT: Can you get it done by Friday also?
 5
              MR. DERFNER: Yes, ma'am. We will.
 6
              THE COURT: All right.
 7
              MR. DERFNER: But I have not heard one word from --
 8
    from the defendants about what on earthy they propose to do
 9
    with federal databases or why they want them and what they
    really --
10
11
              THE COURT: And that's why we're going to get it in
12
    writing, in a brief writing, so we can all be on the same page
13
    as to what people are claiming and what needs to be argued.
14
              Okay. Anything, then --
15
              MR. DERFNER: Well --
16
              THE COURT: Go ahead. I'm sorry; I think I cut
17
    someone off.
18
                            This is Mr. Derfner. (indiscernible)
              MR. DERFNER:
19
              THE COURT: All right. Then, the -- regarding, then,
20
    the hearing we had and the Court's ruling, I am entering the
21
    order as I stated as the Government had proposed; Mr. -- the
22
    defendant, Mr. Scott, is going to be filing a motion regarding
23
    the federal databases, which will be responded to -- sounds
24
    like we should get that by next week.
25
              So, anything else on the document issue, the database
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33
 1
    issue?
 2
              MR. SCOTT: So, will the Court be issuing an order on
 3
    the -- I'm sorry; this is John Scott. Will the Court be
    issuing an order on -- or make an order on the common interest
 4
 5
    and the -- the order we're getting for parties not having to do
 6
    privilege logs?
 7
              THE COURT: No. I've stated it on the record, so --
 8
              MR. SCOTT:
                          Okay.
 9
              THE COURT: All right? Unless you need anything
10
    further; I can clarify right now.
11
              Then, the next thing I have is the motions to quash,
12
    correct?
              If -- who's proceeding on that from the --
13
              MR. D'ANDREA: Your Honor, this is Arthur D'Andrea
14
    with the legislators.
15
              THE COURT: Okay.
16
              MR. D'ANDREA: And, first, I'd like to apologize. I
17
    think I misled Ms. Cortez when I announced. I do not represent
18
    the State. I actually have no interest in whether or not voter
19
    I.D. survives. My only interest in this case is to protect the
20
    legislators' interests.
21
              THE COURT: Okay.
22
              MR. D'ANDREA: So -- so, again, I am not here on
23
    behalf of the state, but for the (indiscernible) legislators.
24
              When you say motion to quash, your Honor, do you mean
25
    the motion to quash the subpoena to testify or the motions to
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quash the trans- -- for the subpoenas for documents that were recently transferred to the Court?

THE COURT: Well, what is before the Court for the Court to address.

MR. D'ANDREA: Okay.

THE COURT: I'm assuming there's a lot of similar issues, so whatever I have jurisdiction over, whatever is before this Court, I'll be happy to address today if we can.

MR. D'ANDREA: Okay. Well, I'd like, then, to start with document -- the subpoenas for documents that were recently transferred to the Court. The vast majority of those that were transferred are identical to subpoenas this Court has already ruled on. And, so, we can just put those aside, and I assume the Court will just apply its prior ruling on -- on those subpoenas. But there is one that is different, and that's the one that I think merits some attention from the Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. D'ANDREA: And that is the subpoena for e-mail searches of Texas Legislative Council's e-mail address. So, this subpoena is different, because all of the other document subpoenas were just asking for documents from the legislators by subject matter, such as everything related to SB 14, and they allowed the legislators to file a response, which is the usual course of discovery. But to TLC the plaintiffs have sent broad search terms to 75 different people for TLC to run in

- 1 | their computers. And one problem with the subpoena is that
- 2 | many of these people are duplicates. So, there are 17
- 3 legislators listed in the TLC subpoena that are duplications.
- 4 So, for example, DOJ subpoenaed Speaker Straus
- 5 directly, and they've demanded that Speaker Straus search his
- 6 office for documents and that he search his e-mail computer,
- 7 his work computer, and work e-mail, for every document related
- 8 to SB 14. And then DOJ has now turned around and asked TLC to
- 9 search Speaker Straus's work e-mail for every document related
- 10 to (indiscernible).
- 11 THE COURT: Okay. But isn't this something that as
- 12 | attorneys you all should be able to get together and discuss?
- 13 | If it's duplication, we shouldn't be having duplication. It's
- 14 just inefficient. But why am I having to step in on that
- 15 | issue? Who's speaking for the plaintiffs?
- 16 MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, this is Dan Freeman on
- 17 | behalf of the United States. We would be happy to discuss the
- 18 proper methods to search legislators' official e-mail.
- 19 However, due to the position taken by legislators and the State
- 20 of Texas in this litigation, it was necessary to subpoena the
- 21 | legislators in their individual capacity in order to obtain the
- 22 private e-mails that many legislators use to (indiscernible)
- 23 legislation. On the other hand, because the proper method to
- 24 | search a large group of individuals' e-mails that are all
- 25 stored on the same server to ensure uniformity is to search

- 1 from the server side. We separately subpoenaed the TLC, and
- 2 | that's a method of search that the Perez court, you know, in
- 3 redistricting just permitted.
- 4 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. D'Andrea?
- 5 MR. D'ANDREA: Your Honor --
- 6 MR. FREEMAN: Go ahead.
- 7 MR. D'ANDREA: Yeah, I -- I still don't understand.
- 8 | I still didn't hear an answer for the duplication. Because
- 9 (indiscernible) they've already asked Speaker Straus and 16
- 10 other legislators to search --
- 11 THE COURT: Okay. But isn't this -- isn't this
- 12 | something that you all should be communicating on? I feel like
- 13 | I'm kind of baby-sitting a conversation here, that maybe you
- 14 | all should figure out what it is.
- 15 MR. D'ANDREA: We can -- we can -- we'll -- we can
- 16 talk about the duplication, your Honor.
- 17 **THE COURT:** Okay.
- 18 | MR. D'ANDREA: I will -- I will reach out to
- 19 Mr. Freeman --
- 20 **THE COURT:** All right.
- 21 MR. D'ANDREA: -- after this. And, so, we can --
- 22 MR. FREEMAN: That's not (indiscernible).
- 23 MR. D'ANDREA: We can bracket that.
- 24 **THE COURT:** Okay.
- 25 MR. D'ANDREA: I would like to raise one more issue.

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1 THE COURT: Okay.
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MR. D'ANDREA: And that is the second way that this subpoena is overbroad. And those are the search terms. And maybe this is something else you'd prefer that we discuss, but we -- I -- (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Well, have you all discussed? Because it certainly should be discussed by the lawyers before I step in.

MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor --

MR. D'ANDREA: We have.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FREEMAN: Sorry.

MR. D'ANDREA: We have, your Honor. But it -- do you think there is value to us resolving this? We will have further discussion to see if we can work this out.

MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, it sounds like you all think there might be.

MR. FREEMAN: We -- we negotiated the search terms with Mr. Whitley on behalf of the State of Texas back when the State of Texas -- and the State of Texas ran the search terms to test whether they would be, you know, proper terms, back when the State of Texas was still admitting that they had control over TLC. They then disclaimed control of the TLC and, so, the subpoena contained the last set of search terms that we had sent back and forth to the State of Texas. It's our

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1
    understanding that they were proper and had been tested
 2
    already, and to the extent that there are specific concerns
 3
    regarding the search terms, we're happy -- we're happy to
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    change some, but these --
 5
              THE COURT: Well, have you all --
              MR. FREEMAN: -- (indiscernible) forward.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: -- discussed this, Counsel? Have you all
    discussed -- did you discuss that with Mr. D'Andrea?
 8
 9
              MR. FREEMAN: At the time, I believe, that we issued
10
    subpoena to TLC Mr. D'Andrea was not yet representing them.
11
              THE COURT: And I just want a yes or no so I can tell
12
    you all to go talk.
13
              MR. FREEMAN: I'm happy to go talk (indiscernible).
14
              THE COURT: Okay. All right. What else,
15
    Mr. D'Andrea?
16
              MR. D'ANDREA: The next thing, your Honor, is
17
    (indiscernible).
                       The next thing we have is subpoena to
18
    testify, use the depositions, subpoenas. So, DOJ has briefed
19
    this and responded to our motion to quash, and their response
20
    suggests that the Department of Justice was pleased with the
21
    D.C. court's order in Texas versus Holder and if they still --
22
    if that is true, then the legislators also (indiscernible) an
23
    identical order that the D.C. court issued in Texas v. Holder,
24
    which is to say this court will not quash subpoenas, it should
25
    adopt the same approach as that court and allow deposition
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testimony about public information and general legislative purposes only. Even the San Antonio court has walked back this part of the decision compelling legislators to testify --

THE COURT: Yeah, I can --

MR. D'ANDREA: -- (indiscernible).

THE COURT: I can kind of cut to the chase here, and then you all can point -- you all can argue some more if you want to, but I'm inclined to do exactly what the Perez court said. They provided -- their initial order said the -- I'm not going to quash the depositions entirely. I am inclined to follow what the Perez court said initially saying that the deponents could answer and the answer would be sealed and submitted to the Court for in camera; alternatively, their second order said the deponent could choose not to answer specific questions, the plaintiff could then file a motion to compel, and the Court would determine whether the privilege -- whether it had been waived or whether the Court should compel an answer. So, I will let you all, now that you all know what I'm inclined to do, argue further.

Mr. D'Andrea?

MR. D'ANDREA: Yes. Yes, your Honor. Well, thank you for giving me a preview of your thoughts. I think -- that would work, (indiscernible) quash them. You know, I would say our information is, if -- if my client's trying to decide not to waive the privilege, our information will probably be to

- adopt part B and then generate motions to compel.
- 2 **THE COURT:** Okay.

1

- 3 MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, this is Dan Freeman on
- 4 | behalf of the United States. The distinction between the two
- 5 Perez orders had to do fundamentally with the amount of time
- 6 remaining before trial in each one of those cases, so the
- 7 amount of time really remaining before the end of fact
- 8 discovery. The first Perez order was issued imminently before
- 9 | a preliminary injunction hearing, and they used the procedure
- 10 | that was the only possible procedure to allow a deposition to
- 11 be completed prior to closing fact discovery. Now, the second
- 12 Perez order was issued six months before the end of fact
- 13 discovery in the second phase of that case.
- 14 At this point we simply don't have time for the
- 15 United States to go to Texas, depose each of these legislators,
- 16 have those legislators broadly assert state legislative
- 17 privilege, as they did in *Texas v Holder*, come back to this
- 18 | Court, ask for this Court to overcome that limited, qualified
- 19 privilege, and then go back to Texas and conduct those
- 20 depositions again. (indiscernible)
- 21 **THE COURT:** Well, that's what we're going to have to
- 22 do. We are where we are.
- 23 MR. D'ANDREA: I under -- will your Honor be amenable
- 24 to allowing the United States to pause depositions and contact
- 25 | the Court --

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41
 1
              THE COURT:
                          I --
 2
              MR. D'ANDREA: -- in order to allow things to proceed
 3
    in an expeditious manner?
 4
              THE COURT: You know, if I anticipated, it would be
 5
    just here and there, I would allow that. I just don't know
    what this is going to be like. I have a horrendous docket.
 6
 7
    don't mean to whine here, but I've already told you all we have
 8
    had a vacancy here for three years, so I don't know -- I would
    be open to that; I just don't know if it's really feasible.
10
              MR. D'ANDREA: Your Honor, and -- and I don't mean to
11
    be flippant in asking this question, but how -- how would your
12
    Honor like us to proceed given the imminent close of fact
13
    discovery?
14
              THE COURT: Well --
15
              MR. D'ANDREA: At this time --
16
              THE COURT: When are the depositions?
17
              MR. D'ANDREA: -- the State has given us --
18
              THE COURT:
                          When are the depositions scheduled?
19
              MR. D'ANDREA: The State didn't give us dates until
20
    this Wednesday, 5:00 p.m. Central. We have asked for a few
21
    changes; we have not heard back from the State yet.
22
              THE COURT: When -- when are the depositions
23
    scheduled?
24
              MR. D'ANDREA: They're the last -- they're the
25
    last -- well, excuse me.
                              Ten of them are the last two weeks of
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- 1 | fact discovery. Two of them have already been scheduled in
- 2 July, and it's my understanding that two of the other -- two of
- 3 | them are also on the last two days before expert depositions
- 4 | are due, and the (indiscernible).
- 5 THE COURT: Well, I have given you the order. You
- 6 | all need to sit down and visit about how that's going to be
- 7 done, whether you're going to immediately after the deposition
- 8 | file some sort of brief or a joint statement with the Court and
- 9 then we get on the phone. You all can visit about that and
- 10 talk to Brandy. I mean, it's not the Court's fault that we are
- 11 where we are. This case has been pending almost a year.
- 12 | Correct?
- 13 (Pause; No audible response)
- 14 **THE COURT:** Is anybody on?
- 15 MR. D'ANDREA: Yes, your Honor. I'm just --
- 16 MR. SPEAKER: Thank you, your Honor.
- 17 MR. D'ANDREA: -- trying to figure out exactly how we
- 18 | can (indiscernible) this before the close of fact discovery
- 19 (indiscernible) --
- 20 THE COURT: Well, it's not going to -- I think your
- 21 depositions will be done before the fact discovery, but I'm
- 22 going to have to be hearing things after that; if we have to
- 23 reopen them, I'm going to allow that to be reopened after
- 24 | the -- depositions to be reopened after the discovery deadline.
- 25 It's the only thing we can do at this point.

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 1
    motion to quash? Is there anything left hanging?
 2
              MR. D'ANDREA: No, your Honor. It's my understanding
 3
    there is not. If your Honor would find it useful, the United
    States would be happy to provide a proposed order giving the 39
 4
 5
    dockets that these various motions to quash are currently
    sitting and (indiscernible) the order (indiscernible) -- or the
 6
 7
    district court (indiscernible).
              THE COURT: Well, and -- right. And before I start
 8
 9
    getting competing orders, why don't you draft an order, send it
10
    to the defense; if there is an issue, we can get on -- we can
11
    address it. You can get with Brandy.
12
              MR. D'ANDREA: Thank you, your Honor.
13
              THE COURT: What other motions are anticipated? I
    understand there may be -- I don't -- let me just ask this.
14
15
    When the legislators were deposed in the other matter, did they
16
    claim the privilege? I mean, was it like repeated throughout
17
    the depositions? What -- I have no idea what to anticipate in
18
    terms of --
19
              MR. SPEAKER: Your Honor (indiscernible) --
20
              THE COURT: -- being available or handling it as a
21
    motion to compel.
                       What -- what --
22
              MR. D'ANDREA: And it -- it went by -- it depended on
23
    the legislator.
24
              THE COURT: And who is speaking?
25
              MR. D'ANDREA:
                             Some of them -- Arthur D'Andrea.
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1 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. D'ANDREA: Some of the legislators waived the privilege entirely, expressed a desire to do so, and then just spoke for seven hours. Some of them -- for example, we -- it was recently a deposition, you know, (indiscernible) took of Chairman (indiscernible), and in that one he asserted the privilege using the second option. So, counsel -- every time -- okay, if they asked what was the general legislative purpose, he answered; and if they asked about public statements, he answered; but if they asked anything about his own mental impressions or anything privileged, we instructed him not to answer, and he did not answer, and the deposition continued. And that continued throughout the deposition. So -
MR. FREEMAN: And, your Honor -- your Honor,

THE COURT: Who's speaking?

MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, Mr. D'Andrea is referring to redistricting depositions --

THE COURT: Who's speaking? You all need to announce 19 because --

MR. FREEMAN: Dan Freeman. I'm sorry. This is Dan Freeman on behalf of the United States. In Texas v Holder each and every one of the bill proponents asserted a state legislative privilege and refused to answer broad swaths of the deposition testimony. There were pages upon pages of speaking -- of speaking objections, instructing the legislators

- 1 | transcript of some of the depositions from Texas v Holder and
- 2 | highlight portions of those -- of those transcripts in which --
- 3 to which objections were made out of the state legislative
- 4 privilege.
- 5 THE COURT: No, thank you. I'm sure I'll be reading
- 6 enough depositions from this case.
- 7 MR. FREEMAN: I was just --
- 8 THE COURT: But thank you.
- 9 MR. FREEMAN: -- (indiscernible).
- 10 **THE COURT:** Okay. What other motions are anticipated
- 11 | in this case? I'm trying to get a feel for what the Court will
- 12 be facing between now and September.
- 13 | MR. CLAY: Your Honor, this is Reid Clay of the State
- 14 of Texas. You're aware of the 30(b)(6) protective order, so
- 15 | that one's out there.
- 16 **THE COURT:** Right.
- 17 MR. CLAY: Obviously, the federal databases is also
- 18 out there. We will also be filing probably a pretty broad
- 19 | swath of motions for summary judgment based upon both some
- 20 | substantive issues but also some jurisdictional issues based
- 21 upon deposition testimony from many of the plaintiffs in this
- 22 case.
- THE COURT: Okay. I mean, what -- what about from
- 24 | the plaintiffs?
- 25 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, this is Chad Dunn on behalf of

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the Veasey LULAC plaintiffs. I can imagine that there will be some motions in limine filed, and, of course, we'll have to respond; the summary judgment motions have to be heard. final thing, just to see if I can put a finer point on it, and really all of the legislator -- all of the legislators that were key to the development and adoption of SB 14 were deposed in the Section 5 case, and at this point to reconvene at a deposition and -- it's almost exclusively going to be on the topics that they wouldn't answer before, so unless these legislators change their position on where they think that the legislative privilege lies, we can expect that the vast majority of these reconvened -- or these depositions completed in this cause number, you know, are going to have to be dealt with. Now, I can imagine they'll probably fall into several categories, so the Court can resolve it on a category basis, but I think you can expect that to happen.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DERFNER: This is Derfner. What I would say is this. Recognizing what your Honor said about the burden, we all know that, and I'm aware of it, too, obviously. If there is some way that the parties can tee this up quickly by -- and possibly hear the motion -- the motions soon after the first or second deposition, the others probably wouldn't be that much different.

THE COURT: Yeah. I agree.

1 | scheduled -- when are the first depositions taking place?

2 MR. D'ANDREA: The first depositions, your Honor, the

3 | 16th or 17th, your Honor. We're still responding to some

4 requests to move them around. But it's that -- that week of

5 | the 16th is the first one. I -- I like the idea of getting

6 | this done quickly. I would need to reach out to these

7 | legislators and figure out are they going to waive the

8 privilege. Now, they've -- they've asserted the privilege so

9 far, but at least in the redistricting case, some of them

10 | changed their minds when faced with a deposition.

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MR. DERFNER: We couldn't just find out whether they've changed their minds? And then, based on that, there would be enough material to -- not -- not going over the homework of the Holder court; (indiscernible) legislators would take the same position they did there, and not answer the same questions.

MR. D'ANDREA: I (indiscernible). This is D'Andrea. (indiscernible) reach out to them and see if they would still assert it. And, so, of course, they can always change their mind up to the (indiscernible) deposition, but I imagine sometime that week we could probably get a legislator who asserts the privilege and tees this up.

MR. FREEMAN: And, your Honor, I would just say that to the extent that the legislators have claimed that the privilege bars any deposition, I think that we're -- that this

- 1 | week of the 16th, but we've got some responses due. I'm not
- 2 | sure if you want to hold it that week.
- 3 THE COURT: Do you all want to have a status
- 4 | conference, like, on that Wednesday or Thursday, which would
- 5 give you a couple of depositions under your belt?
- 6 MR. D'ANDREA: At this Court's earliest convenience,
- 7 your Honor.
- 8 MR. SPEAKER: Yes, your Honor. That sounds good.
- 9 MR. SPEAKER: That sounds good.
- 10 **THE COURT:** Okay. Let's see. Brandy?
- 11 MR. SCOTT: And, your Honor. John Scott. That's
- 12 June 17th or 18th?
- 13 MR. ROSENBERG: June 18th or 19th; Wednesday or
- 14 Thursday.
- 15 **COURT RECORDER:** (indiscernible)
- 16 **THE COURT:** You're not identifying yourselves. I'm
- 17 going to have to -- I'm going --
- 18 MR. ROSENBERG: I'm sorry. That was Ezra Rosenberg.
- 19 **THE COURT:** I'm going to have Brandy be the name
- 20 patrol from now on out, so she can jump in any time she sees
- 21 necessary.
- 22 So, what about June 18th at 2:00 o'clock? Because
- 23 | I've got a full day of sentencings, but I can probably hear you
- 24 in the afternoon.
- 25 MR. ROSENBERG: Ezra Rosenberg here. That's fine;

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    fine for us, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: And at least to just get a feel for
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    what's going on at the depositions and how we need to proceed
    with the privilege issue. At that point we should also, then,
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 5
    have the briefing on the federal database, correct?
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              MR. SCOTT: Correct.
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              MS. BALDWIN: Yes, your Honor.
 8
              THE COURT: And --
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              MR. SCOTT: John Scott.
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              THE COURT: I'm sorry. Anything else? See, I know
    you all's voices now, so I want to keep talking, so it's my
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12
    fault, too. Anything else for today?
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              MR. SCOTT: John Scott on behalf of Texas, and
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    nothing from our standpoint.
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              THE COURT: Plaintiff?
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              MR. ROSENBERG: Ezra Rosenberg for Texas NAACP.
17
    Nothing for us, your Honor.
18
              MS. WESTFALL: Elizabeth Westfall for the United
19
    States. Nothing for us.
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              MR. D'ANDREA: Arthur D'Andrea. We're good, too,
21
    your Honor. Thank you.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. DERFNER: Armand Derfner, Veasey plaintiffs.
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    Nothing.
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              THE COURT:
                          Then, it sounds like that's all for
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    today. Thank you. You're excused.
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                     Thank you, your Honor.
               ALL:
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         (Proceeding was adjourned at 4:01 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATION
I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-
entitled matter.
June 9, 2014 TONI HUDSON, TRANSCRIBER